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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-1588 
 ___________ 
 
 DOM WADHWA, MD, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1:06-cv-04362) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Joseph E. Irenas 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 4, 2013 
 Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: June 5, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 When this perdurable FOIA/Privacy Act proceeding was last before us, we 
decided, in part, that the Department of Veterans Affairs (―VA‖) had failed to produce a 
―detailed, nonconclusory affidavit submitted in good faith‖ that would warrant granting 
summary judgment in its favor.  Wadhwa v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 446 F. App’x 516, 
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519–20 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 
182 (3d Cir. 2007); Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1350–51 (D.C. Cir. 
1983)).  Therefore, although we ―affirm[ed] the order of summary judgment as it pertains 
to the records actually produced,‖ we ―vacate[d] and remand[ed] with regard to records 
and documents not produced.‖  Id. at 520.   
 Back before the District Court, the VA submitted another motion for summary 
judgment that contained an updated affidavit.  But this too was judged to be insufficient, 
as the declaration did not, for example, ―state when the second search was conducted‖ or 
―the time period covered by the search.‖  Order Den. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 5, ECF 
No. 102.  Although it denied the motion, the District Court explicitly anticipated the 
filing of another summary judgment request, which would follow shortly thereafter.  To 
its third attempt, the VA attached another detailed declaration from Brendan Minihan 
(supplementing his declaration from the second summary judgment motion) that 
― numerate[ed] . . .  the specific offices and individual queried . . . as well as the search 
terms used in each instance.‖  Supplemental Decl. of Brendan Minihan ¶ 6, ECF No. 108-
2.  Minihan explained that back-up tapes containing emails were not searched,
1
 but other 
locations that were ―most likely to contain [responsive] documents‖ constituted part of 
the investigation.  Supplemental Decl. ¶ 7–9.  Minihan also articulated the date the search 
was performed as well as the time period it covered.  Satisfied that the VA had corrected 
                                                 
1
 Elsewhere, the VA explained that ―restoring all of the VA’s email for even a single day 
would cost over $3 billion and take almost 8,000 years.‖  Def.’s Statement of Material 
Facts ¶ 10, ECF No. 108-5. 
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the shortcomings we identified, the District Court again granted summary judgment in 
the agency’s favor.  Wadhwa timely appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We conclude that the District Court 
had an adequate factual basis for its summary judgment determination and its decision 
was not clearly erroneous, because Minihan’s combined affidavit sufficed to cure the 
defect we identified in his first submission (we need not decide whether the second 
submission would have sufficed standing alone).  See Abdelfattah, 488 F.3d at 182; 
Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1350–51; see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 856 F.2d 309, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1988).   Thus, upon de novo review, we agree that 
summary judgment was properly granted—and, as a result, we will affirm.2 
                                                 
2
 In his opening brief, Wadhwa attempts to raise several issues, such as purported defects 
in the Vaughn index, that were either previously litigated or are not at issue in this appeal.  
To the extent that he contests the District Court’s decision to allow for the filing of 
multiple motions for summary judgment, Wadhwa has not shown that the District Court 
abused its discretion in any way by permitting multiple summary judgment motions.  See 
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(b); Krueger Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co. of Pa., 247 F.3d 61, 65–66 (3d Cir. 
2001) (holding that district court appropriately considered post-discovery summary 
judgment motion despite having denied pre-discovery summary judgment motion); 
Preaseau v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 591 F.2d 74, 79-80 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting summary judgment despite prior 
denial of summary judgment by judge previously assigned to the case).   
